ICC and the DRC

The ICC publicly issued a warrant for the war criminal known as 'the Terminator' in the DRC. This is good news considering the US attempts to undermine the power of the ICC. Also, I think it important that the ICC has already issued three warrants, and has those individuals in custody. This is the fourth warrant.

As three warrants for the arrest of war criminals have already been followed, it is highly likely that this fourth will also be followed. This indicates that even though the DRC's status as a sovereign state may at times be questionable, it is trying to remain part of the international humanitarian law (IHL) regime, despite its warring factions.

Perhaps this indicates that the weaker states that want to become members of the international system are more willing to implement IHL, then states that are already members (i.e. the USA). Nevertheless, it is a good sign, that in the DRC, a country racked with war crimes, the ICC has an ability to exert influence.

Ummm...stinking hypocrisy?

On my colleague's blog, he quotes the following:

"It is important to emphasize that the president can suspend or terminate any treaty or provision of a treaty ... Any presidential decision to order interrogation methods that are inconsistent with [the UN's convention against torture] would amount to a suspension or termination of those treaty provisions" (quoted from above-linked interview)."

This is an extremely worrying perception of the US president's power. It also indicates a potential for violating domestic laws. US domestic law does not allow torture. I do not understand why, if the UN law is not in violation of domestic law, there is such a need for loop-holing. How can an administration that came to office claiming to be religious, seek out loophholes so that it can torture people? It does not make any sense. Fear is not an acceptable answer, and yet, it does appear to have an influence. If 9/11 had not happened, would the American people alway such a disregard of civil rights? Most likely not.

Publicity may skew understanding.

During our last class on the Rules of Law, Dr. Carpenter asked the class what we would individually do to help support the rules of war regime.

I stated that I would talk with family and friends to help promote understanding (while hoping that my own understand was accurate). However, several my class mates mentioned publicizing the issues to raise public awareness.

This tactic is reliant on present the right information:

Awareness raising such as: Basic Rules of War by the Canadian Red Cross, I think increase public misperceptions and misunderstandings about the rules of war. The mention of 'Red Cross,' I think adds an element of legitimacy to the presentation of any humanitarian issue (at least to the general public). But the simplified stating of rules of war on this page, I think undermine the rules of war regime. On this page it states that attacks on civilians and domestic infrastructure are prohibited. However, according to the rules of war, if a target is a legitimate military target it is legal to attack or destroy it, and the civilian causalities are causalities of war, not victims of a war crime. So yes, a military is not to attack civilians - that is a war crime. But recognition between what the rules of war say and how they are implemented my help true understanding about the dynamics of war.


The Additional Protocols acknowledge that during war, civilians die as a result of military actions. As long as the military does not intentionally target civilians, but targets a legitimate military target, it is not against the rules of war.


This specific misperception, I think may often lead to a mislabeling of incidents that involve civilian deaths as a violation of the rules of war when in fact it may be a legal action according to the international regime.

Additional Protocol, Article 51: "The civilian population and individual civilians shall enjoy general protection against dangers arising from military operations."

Additional Protocol I, Article 52: "Attacks shall be limited strictly to military objectives. In so far as objects are concerned, military objectives are limited to those objects which by their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage."

The US is cutting off its nose to spite its face - how lovely

During our last few class discussions and class presentations on the ICC - it appears that the US is pursuing a policy that is determined to undermine the ICC. However, what I find interesting when looking at the this TABLE produced by the Human Security Center in 2005, is that there is a rapidly growing trend of country participation in international tribunals prosecuting 'grave human rights abuses.' The other thing to note, is that even though the hybrid international tribunals hit plateaus in the number of cases they are prosecuting, eventually the number continues to rise. I think that this indicates a learning curve (despite the plateaus - a steep one) in which lawyers are learning how to circumnavigate state sovereignty in pursuit of justice (however by definition a state 'ought' to have a normative basis of justice). It is a shame that the US feels obligated to undermine the ICC (as presented by my colleagues in class), however, the US efforts appear to be ineffective. The US is losing its credibility as a just, democratic nation as it attempts to inhibit international efforts to bring justice.

The current US stance makes no sense. If the US government is willing to implement justice via its own court system and abide by the IHLs, then why does it fear so much. Unless it knowingly makes policy decisions that violate IHL. I realize that sovereignty is an issue, however, it appears to me that the policy-makers lack a global vision of the world and perhaps need a bit more education. Perhaps they should sit in on our class. Again, I realize that this is a null and void thought as the likelihood is nil. But one can always hope.

Sigh those blasted civilians...bring on the markets

There is an assumption made that states protect their citizens. International humanitarian law is structured on the premise that if a state ratifies Additional Protocol II or Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, then those states will protect their citizens. However, evidence indicates that some governments do target civilians (at varying levels). Granted non-state actors target a greater number of civilians than governments, but the fact remains that government do target civilians. This is perplexing, and makes me wonder if perhaps some of these governments need to be reclassified. If the definition of a state includes providing public services, targeting them does not fulfill that bargain. Perhaps some of those entities labeled states ought to be relabeled into 'entities' instead of states, because by definition they are not functioning as the defined norm of a state.

Where does the pressure come from to establish the process of changing a state's identity because it not does comply with the norm of statehood? It is acknowledged that this is a naive question as sovereignty comes into play. But it seems that forcing change is not really an option - even if there is a hegemon. A hegemon wants to benefit from trade, not from spending money on war to 'fix' or 'help' populations that do not influence the well-being of its own citizens. Increasingly it appears that markets are more important than the rules of war, which is worrying.

Our SEALs: Doing what they have to do.

In this interesting NPR piece a SEAL recounts how his unit was ambushed by the Taliban and he is the only one that survives. He notes that they were ambushed because they let some goat-herders go instead of tying them up or killing them. He notes that they let them go because he is Christian as well as a soldier. However, he also argues that soldiers need to be able to do what they have to on the battlefield, while at the same time distinguishing civilians from combatants. It is interesting to read that a soldier/SEAL questions how they (rule bound soldiers) are supposed to fight guerrillas. He notes that over time the SEALs have adopted more guerrilla like tactics, which has decreased their wounded and killed. Upon reading his account, it is apparent why Iraqi fear the Americans. However, from the soldiers' perspective, it is what they have to do to live. It is a difficult one to argue as both the soldiers and the civilians have legitimate claims. Perhaps a fund to fix broken doors and houses would help alleviate the Iraqi fears and resentment and enable the soldiers to continue to conduct their more guerrilla-like tactics.

The second interesting point made is that money buys the SEALs a great portion of their useful on the spot intelligence. He notes that if the guy is particularly stubborn he is sent to interrogation headquarters, but it sounds like money works more often than not. I thought this relevant as a result of our class discussions about the (in)effectiveness of torture.

Iraq: Domestic Policing versus the Rules of War

While reading this article on BBC news, two items did not quite fit with what we have been learning and discussing in class.

First, the article discusses the usage of Iraqi police in combination with US soldiers. What rules are supposed to be followed if the US soldiers are expected to continue fighting the insurgents but at the same time are expected to interact with the Iraq police. I would assume that the domestic police force have different 'rule of engagement' per se than soldiers. Is this an issue, or what 'evolution' have the ROW experienced to deal with such a situation, are they even applicable?

Second, at the end of the article, it notes that civilian clothed soldiers were sent into a neighborhood:

"Fighting broke out after US troops in civilian clothes entered a central district of Hilla, they said. US military sources said the clash started after troops went to arrest rogue elements in the Mehdi Army."

Does this not go against one of the primary 'norms/rules' that were designed to protect our soldiers abroad? This little sentence indicates to me a policy decision that indicates a disregard for the well being of the US soldier or a lack of understanding of the purpose and design of the ROW designed to protect POWs.

What specific policy changes to US military doctrine would decrease the levels of atrocity by US forces in conflict situations and in detention?

After watching the film Ghosts of Abu Ghraib, it appears that there is a lack of responsibility within the leadership of the civilian lead military establishment that left the individual solider confused.

The first thing I found worrisome was the issue of the rules of engagement. In the documentary, there was an interview with one of the military police/soldiers, who said that when he landed in Iraq, he asked for the rule of engagement (ROE). He was told if it looks like the enemy - shoot it. However, that goes against the function of a the rules of engagement card which sets the parameters of action for the solider, which is based on self defense. [For an example of ROE click here.] The ROE also lets the soldier, who is disconnected from policy-making, know what his/her government expects of him/her, as the government is the employer.

However, what is apparent in the film is that there was no 'leadership' that guided the actions of soldiers once he/she became confused. In the documentary, it appeared the the US combatants at Abu Ghraib were fearful and disoriented. They were given the perspective of us versus them, and that they were directly involved with preventing another 9/11. This policy-maker implemented fear and confusion lead to really horrible things.

What comes through is that Bush, Rumsfield, General Miller, and the other 'politicians' are poor leaders. Edgar Puryear argues that a good military leader in the American military is apolitical, selfless (meaning takes responsibility when things go wrong, gives credit when things go well), is professional, loves his soldiers and looks to their well being, and refuses to be or surround himself/herself with 'Yes Men.' The President is the Commander in Chief of our military. However, the breakdown in the chain of command leading to Abu Ghraib results from bad leadership. The Bush possy all acted as Yes Men as did American Generals such as Miller. It is telling that those that did not agree with the Bush possy were sidelined, which is further evidence of extremely bad leadership. They also put newbies in charge of an overcrowded prison, made soldiers/military police into prison guards, for which they had NO training, and it appears that from the video, were never given such training. With a population of several thousand inmates and only a few soldiers guarding/running the facility, it is apparent that fear and an inability to deal with the situation would arise. However, this is not the soldiers' fault. It is the government's fault as it left its soldiers unable to deal with a situation as per IHL, even if they had wanted to.

In the documentary, a clip is shown of Rumsfield stating that he forgot the chain of command paper work so could not answer a question. This incident indicates a dissociation with the military establishment that the SECDEF is supposed to be coordinating. As Clausewitz indicates, the military is an instrument of the civilian government. As the Bush possy were bad leaders, the effects of bad leadership led to confusion and wide interpretation of the 'rules' that permeated down though the ranks. I believe that if the ground soldiers had been given the proper procedural guidance, Abu Ghraib would not have happened (or at least to the extent it did). The government sanctioned the inhumane treatment and torture of these prisoners through a lack of leadership.

A few reflection on how the US government could have prevented the atrocities of Abu Ghraib:

1. Ensure that all soldiers have the rules of engagement - the 'if it looks like the enemy shoot' is not acceptable.
2. Provide more 'guards.' The government ought to realize that soldiers are trained for specific tasks. If the soldiers are given a specific task that hey are not trained to do, it is important to supplement their new task with guidance and training.
3. Do no put a General already criticized of human rights and IHL violations in a position to inflict more damage, as this is a sanctioning by the government of continued violations.
4. The US Congress needs to take greater control and FORCE the Bush possy to take responsibility for its bad and inept leadership. This would enhance the institutionalization within the military the importance of IHL and the government's desire to follow them.
   
5. It must be remembered that the military is an instrument of the civilian government, it is the government who makes the policy that the military follows.
   

IHL huge success?

According to a 2007 BBC Article, the establishment of the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocols have been a huge success in establishing and sustaining a distinction between civilians and combatants during conflict. However, I would have to argue that I do not agree. I think that it is overly optimistic of Imogen Foulkes, the author, to claim that IHL has established a norm in which civilians are not targeted by fighters. Especially as recent estimates of Iraqi civilian causalities are extremely high in comparison to US troop causalities. If the US was making a sustained effort to distinguish between Iraqi fighters and innocent civilians, then the estimates should not be as high. Also, the US is experiencing increasing pressure at home to resolve the current problem, which means that it may use increasingly harsh means to achieve its 'victory.' (Downes, 2006; and Valentino et al, 2006). If the norm of identifying yourself as a combatant was as strong as this article believes, the fighters in Iraqi would distinguish themselves from the civilian population, however, they do not. I also think that the violation of IHL is increasing as a result of US open deviance from the IHL regime as per my previous post. Also, in terms of internal conflicts, state's claim that their sovereignty is dominant and international norms and regulations are secondary to national security needs.

I do not understand how different standards can apply to internal and international conflict. Also, how is the IHL regime going to adapt to the changing nature of war and conflict? As non-state actors increasingly play a role, but do no adhere to the regime, what will happen to the regime?

Combining Two: Brazen Disregard and the Martens Clause

On page 135, Byers writes,

Previous administrations at least paid lip-service to the existence of normative constraints by concealing and denying their covert operations. The Bush Administration… lets the mask slip, to the discredit of the nation and… at the peril of the soldiers whom so many of the rules are designed to protect.

Open violation by the world’s unipolar power (Layne, 2006) of the customary norms, rules of war and IHL that structure the international system precipitates a general downward trend in respecting the individual and potential increase of anarchy in battle. It is realized that a different Administration may bring back the importance of the Geneva Conventions, but undoing the damage may take some time.

Historically, a hegemon supports a regime as it sees the big picture strategy, which is in its best interest, and is willing to take the ‘negatives’ to maintain that regime (Kindleberger 1951, and Krasner, 1976). It is commonly believed that protecting human rights at the domestic and international level is important and in accordance with American values. This is demonstrated by the aid distributed by the US government to countries to facilitate thgovernment reforms to enhance democracy. The American nation was founded on the principles of civil liberties and restricting state invasive interference in the lives of people. However, Bush indicates that national security is more important than respecting the foundations of the nation he is currently leading. Despite historical evidence, which indicates Americans are more focused on domestic than foreign affairs, and want to safe guard their rights over national security issues (Jordan et al, 1999), Bush seems to disregard the norms of the US. Even if Bush and his Administration openly disregard the Geneva Conventions and IHL, he should at least abide by the Martens Clause which states if the rules of war can not be agreed upon, the state should follow its own national laws as per below:

in cases not included in the Regulations adopted by them, the inhabitants and the belligerents remain under the protection and the rule of the principles of the law of nations, as they result from the usages established among civilized peoples, from the laws of humanity, and the dictates of the public. [emphasis added by me] [Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907].

The US government of the time ratified the treaty. In cases of disagree, this Clause permits a return to national laws and security, which is interesting as the US Constitution in the Judicial section, note not Executive, it states:

Article 3 - The Judicial Branch: Section 3 - Treason
Treason against the United States, shall consist only in levying War against them, or in adhering to their Enemies, giving them Aid and Comfort. No Person shall be convicted of Treason unless on the Testimony of two Witnesses to the same overt Act, or on Confession in open Court. The Congress shall have power to declare the Punishment of Treason, but no Attainder of Treason shall work Corruption of Blood, or Forfeiture except during the Life of the Person attainted.

This indicates that if a person commits acts of treason (attacking or going to war on the US government) then the Judicial Branch of the government has the right and authority to deal with that person. I do not understand how Bush thinks he has the authority to bypass the founding fathers of this nation, which as a result damages the prospects that American soldiers or civilians caught in a conflict will be treated with the norms of IHL.

As a result of this open disregard of IHL and the basic principles of the US norms, Bush is indicating the soldiers are no longer valuable once they are captured or detained by ‘enemy combatants.’ I highly doubt the American people would agree that their individual rights and the protection of their armed forces are secondary issues in the realm of global norms. If Bush and his Administration were truly concerned about ‘national security’ in this GWOT, then he would allot greater funding to the surveillance of ports and other infrastructure of the state. However, Bush is currently fear-mongering by seeking an ‘easy’ and unethical way through his declared GWOT. In his belief of American preponderant position in the political, economic, and military spheres of the globe he forgets that for every action there is a reaction. Terrorists and other actors may increasingly have justification for ignoring or leaving the IHL regime because the US has openly left.

Apparently I have a very negative view of the prospects of IHL if the hegemon of the system openly violates and indicates it does not support the regime, indicating that the regime will begin to crack and crumble.

Johnson's Noncombatants

In Johnson's Mortality and Contemporary Warfare, Chapter 4, he discusses the issue of the possible justifications and (im)morality in attacking noncombatants.

However, upon reading the section about the nondiscriminatory attacks on Tutsi and Hutu refugees, what appears to be severely lacking is a focus on the Hutu fighters usig Hutu refugees as shields. On page 140, the first full paragraph, Johnson alludes to the Hutu fighters using human shields as protection, but focuses more on the immoral nature of the Tutsis killing the Hutu refugees after it was realized that the Hutu fighters were using human shields. However, this mentioning is minimal and not specific. There is greater discussion about the wrongs done by the Tutsi fighters. However, to me the Hutu fighters have the greater blame, if such a word can be utilized, as they introduced the noncombatants into the conflict. Upon not being able to distinguish between combatants and noncombatants, the Tutsi fighters became non-discriminant in their targeting.

Please correct me if I am wrong.

Interplay of norms: Democracy and Protecting State Sovereignty

A norm is 'collective expectations of the appropriate behavior of an actor with a particular identity.' (as per our class discussion)

BBC News published an article today, 'West 'embraces sham democracies', in which it is stated 'HRW said Pakistan, Thailand, Bahrain, Jordan, Nigeria, Kenya and Russia had been falsely claiming to be democratic.' This article also cites HRM as accusing the US and EU member states of accepting less than democratic regimes.

This report brings to light the interplay between two primary norms that are fighting for supremacy: democracy and state sovereignty, in the international system. These two concepts are primary elements that structure the international regime (as defined by Krasner, 1983) of politics, economics, and law. However, these two norms may restrict state behavior in the international system. Democracy (political openness) has become the expected regime type (Simmons et al, 2006) and as "[Vaughan] Lowe points out, state responsibility is a fundamental, primary norm, on which other norms are built.' (Percy, 2007).

First, democracy.
The USA and EU member states 'push' for democracy and NGOs such as Freedom House and the Center for International Development and Conflict Management rank states according to their compliance with the norm of a 'democratic' regime. There is 'Western' condemnation of a state that denies its citizens democratic freedoms. However, if a state holds questionable elections or denies elections or is clearly not pursuing a democratic regime, aside from tailored criticism, not much is done by other states to enforce democratic practices (other than withholding financial aid). The pursuit of a democratic regime, I think can be labeled as a regulative and constitutive norm, if that is possible. I think democracy is a regulatory norm because sometimes aide is withheld from a state by another state or an IO unless it implements greater democratic reforms. This can be seen in application of the Washington Consensus implement by the IMF and World Bank. Those states that do not comply are made to justify why they are not complying and then reform themselves. However, this weak, voluntary form of compliance does not have universal support and only functions in those countries that agree to the terms of the IO loans. There are also other states that in times of financial crisis seek their own path to stability, ignoring international pressures to conform.

Second, state sovereignty.
As the state structure is the norm by which the international system is structured, maintaining this norm is essential even if the dominant states of the system do not agree with the regime type of a weaker state. International laws and IHL are structured on the state structure. Both regimes expect/rely on the state to enforce the norms that develop. However, states adapt and utilize international laws and IHL to their own advantage as and when necessary. For example, the US's continued usage of Guantanamo Bay, usage of 'secret' prisons in less than democratic states, and reported violations of Iraqi civilian right by US soldiers/PMFs - are all explained in terms of securing and protecting state sovereignty (national security). State is a norm based on the constitutive nature of a norms as the state is often used to identified a group.

State sovereignty is enshrined as the key norm which international law seeks to ensure regardless of regime type and strength. However, it appears that a state's sovereignty is strengthened by its ability to put into place democratic practices. For a state to increase its legitimacy within the international system it has to implement greater political reforms that lead to democracy. States may choose to open or not to open. If a state chooses not to create a democratic regime, it is exercising its sovereignty. However, capital flows and international trade may be effected forcing the state to chose to follow the norm of democracy over protecting its sovereign self-interest of retaining corrupt or more authoritarian regimes. As per HRW claims in the article, democratic states are accepting less then democratic regimes in non-democratic states enable to secure the norm based system based on states.

• Feedback will be appreciated as I feel that my thoughts are jumbled and not pulled together into a coherent argument/fashion.
• Do you see an interplay between state sovereignty and democracy?

Humanitarian Worldview

Martha Finnemore (1999) notes that the 'humanitarian worldview asserts that individuals have status and worth independent of their relationship to states.' (152) This is true, but then what entity will protect the individual? The 'liberal' views of democracy and the market are based on the the idea of the individual. Is this dominant form of individualism different in times of war? This quote makes me think of Karl Polanyi (1944) and his view that the market is embedded in the social structures of the state, without this embeddedness social disintegration would occur. If the humanitarian worldview separates the individual from the state, who is to protect the individual? Currently there is not really an IGO or NGO strong enough to override a state.
Sarah Percy (2007) notes that one of the reasons anti-mercenary laws and other weak laws exist is that the legal language may at times be too precise: "[Vaughan] Lowe points out, state responsibility is a fundamental, primary norm, on which other norms are built. Tinkering with state responsibility for the sake of creating law on mercenaries would have disrupted the entire system of international law." (386) In some ways this quote strengthens my concern or discomfort with the quote from Finnemore. Yes the individual's rights should be respected, however, in states suffering from conflict, what mechanism should be put into place other than state structures to protect the individual? Finnemore does not present an alternative, she just notes the humanitarian worldview.

Movie: Three Kings...norms v laws; self interest v rules of law.

Three Kings:

Watch the film for evidence of "norms" at work. To what extent is the behavior of the actors interest-based versus rule-based? How do you know the difference? Explain in the context of the supplementary readings.

IHL is frequently inhibited by the more powerful norm of state sovereignty. States do not want their internal affairs affected by an outside force and strive to protect their sovereignty through customary and international law. This nexus between IHL and intervention is depicted in the movie Three Kings. In this film, the US and allies have just signed a ceasefire with Iraq ‘concluding’ the Gulf War. However, in this film, this treaty creates a space where the interplay between the established rules of war and the self-interest of specific US soldiers interact.

It is assumed that the US military is highly organized and ethical (despite the recent events of Abu Ghraib). However, in this film, the self-interests of four US soldiers enable them to utilize a ceasefire to pursue ‘looting.’ Upon finding a ‘butt map,’ the soldiers do not report to their superiors as per the established chain of command as they believe they will be able to gain financially (and illegally). The US soldiers believe that because the ceasefire has been signed they can go into Iraqi territory and do just about whatever they want as long as they do not engage the ‘enemy’ (Iraqi troops) or interfere with the domestic population. During the course of the film, only one Iraqi commander attempts to stop the US soldiers, which provokes hostilities and shots being fired. As long as the US soldiers did not see any human rights violations, they were prepared to break rules in order to pursue self interested financial gain. However, once they witness the severe human rights violations, the soldiers break the rules of the treaty, the norms of non-interference, and attempt to protect the villagers and their financial interest through thievery.

What is interesting while watching the film, is that as long as the US troops did not interfere with the domestic affairs of Iraq, the Iraqis were prepared to ignore the rule breaking of the US soldiers. Ward Thomas writes that ‘state actors are more likely to be governed by the norm (than international law)’ (43). However, even though government policy is not to interfere in the domestic affairs of a state, the soldiers, once they were aware of the human rights violations were unable to comply with non-interference in domestic affairs. Also despite the stronger affect of norms on state actors, the soldiers (ranging from highly trained and organized to uneducated) did not follow rules of the ceasefire once noncombatants were targeted.

Also, at the end of the film, when the Iraqi refugees were almost across the border, and the rule following US soldiers finally found the four ‘looting’ soldiers, the aim became primarily to arrest the rule breaking soldiers, without regard for the safety and welfare of the Iraqi refuges. However, like the rule breaking soldiers, once the issue of gold bullion was mentioned, the gold became a bartering chip for the lives of the Iraqi refugees. The self-interest of the soldiers enforced the breaking of the norm that prohibited interference in domestic affairs. The self interest, rule following, interpretation of the rule, or the selflessness of the soldier affects the on the ground actions, while governments far removed make decisions according to norms and international law.

One Young Hero Versus the Mighty Military (Rubbish)

In respond to Bobbie Morgan’s ‘One Young Hero Versus the Mighty Military,’ (26 January 2006).

The article link above does not present a logical argument as it is emotionally based and does not take into the laws and norms of war. Bobbie Morgan uses the term ‘Just War Theory’ to avidly support Lt. Watada’s declaration that he would not fight in Iraq as it was an illegal war.

Briefly and simply, Just War Theory is primarily broken into two parts: jus ad bellum and jus in bello. According to jus ad bellum, it is a government that wages war, not individuals; and jus in bello drives the fair treatment of noncombatants in a war through international monitoring of the actions of the combatant government policies and individual soldiers’ actions.

What Morgan does not acknowledge is that legally, the soldier does not have the ‘right’ to deny his deployment. Lt. Watada believes that the Iraq war is illegal, however, it is the government, his employer, not the individual soldier that decides if a country will go to war. It is up to the state to justify its declaration of war to the international community. Soldiers can decide their individual behavior during war, such as restricting excessive force and fair treatment of the noncombatants. For example, if Lt. Watada had seen Abu Ghraib human rights violations, and had spoken out against his peers, then he would be justified according to the principles of jus in bello for speaking out. However, Lt. Watada freely signed up to the US military, which meant that he agreed to the job of being a US soldier, which means carrying out assigned missions. There have been and will continue to be many military people that do not want to be deployed on missions. However, it is their job. If this man wanted to retain his decision making abilities about whether the US was making accurate decisions about jus ad bellum he should have become a politician, not a soldier.

The military is an organization structured on a hierarchical structure with the decision making at the top of the pyramid, the President. A military would not be able to function if it allowed its soldiers to declare that they thought the military's actions were illegal.

Iraq War and the deaths of noncombatants.

According to Just War Theory's jus in bello, civilians are noncombatants and ought to be protected. This precedent has been established historically by the Geneva Conventions and Protocols.

However, according to the data, roughly 3,500 USA soldiers have died since the war began, but 30,000 to 650,000 Iraqis have died. These Iraqi deaths are a combination of Iraqi soldiers and civilians. If the predominant leader of the system, the USA, does not discriminate between the noncombatants and combatants, how can developing countries mired in conflict be expected to practice jus in bello and protect their civilians? There appears to be a double standard in the application of Just War Theory and the protection of civilians. America's civilians are not more important than Iraqi noncombatants so why this apparent distinction in the value of different nationals' lives?

To access the interactive data table click on: NPR comparative data table.

Mission: "Operation Phantom Phoenix"

On 10 January 2008, as a result of previously harming Iraqi civilians in operations, US troops held off their attack on Al Qaeda held areas in north and south Baghdad, until it appeared that the civilians had fled the area.

It is a good sign that the US military is learning that winning the hearts and minds of the Iraqis is necessary to win the war, and that harming civilians does not help in that endeavor. It does appear to be an improvement in strategy that greater consideration has been given to the civilians. However, it will be interesting to know if the halt until the civilians moved out of the area was successful. Did the 'terrorists' flee with the civilian non-combatants. Was the mission successful, had it or will it achieve its aims? How many noncombatant civilians died or will die as a result of this mission?

To learn more about the Operation please click.