Sigh those blasted civilians...bring on the markets

There is an assumption made that states protect their citizens. International humanitarian law is structured on the premise that if a state ratifies Additional Protocol II or Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, then those states will protect their citizens. However, evidence indicates that some governments do target civilians (at varying levels). Granted non-state actors target a greater number of civilians than governments, but the fact remains that government do target civilians. This is perplexing, and makes me wonder if perhaps some of these governments need to be reclassified. If the definition of a state includes providing public services, targeting them does not fulfill that bargain. Perhaps some of those entities labeled states ought to be relabeled into 'entities' instead of states, because by definition they are not functioning as the defined norm of a state.

Where does the pressure come from to establish the process of changing a state's identity because it not does comply with the norm of statehood? It is acknowledged that this is a naive question as sovereignty comes into play. But it seems that forcing change is not really an option - even if there is a hegemon. A hegemon wants to benefit from trade, not from spending money on war to 'fix' or 'help' populations that do not influence the well-being of its own citizens. Increasingly it appears that markets are more important than the rules of war, which is worrying.

Our SEALs: Doing what they have to do.

In this interesting NPR piece a SEAL recounts how his unit was ambushed by the Taliban and he is the only one that survives. He notes that they were ambushed because they let some goat-herders go instead of tying them up or killing them. He notes that they let them go because he is Christian as well as a soldier. However, he also argues that soldiers need to be able to do what they have to on the battlefield, while at the same time distinguishing civilians from combatants. It is interesting to read that a soldier/SEAL questions how they (rule bound soldiers) are supposed to fight guerrillas. He notes that over time the SEALs have adopted more guerrilla like tactics, which has decreased their wounded and killed. Upon reading his account, it is apparent why Iraqi fear the Americans. However, from the soldiers' perspective, it is what they have to do to live. It is a difficult one to argue as both the soldiers and the civilians have legitimate claims. Perhaps a fund to fix broken doors and houses would help alleviate the Iraqi fears and resentment and enable the soldiers to continue to conduct their more guerrilla-like tactics.

The second interesting point made is that money buys the SEALs a great portion of their useful on the spot intelligence. He notes that if the guy is particularly stubborn he is sent to interrogation headquarters, but it sounds like money works more often than not. I thought this relevant as a result of our class discussions about the (in)effectiveness of torture.

Iraq: Domestic Policing versus the Rules of War

While reading this article on BBC news, two items did not quite fit with what we have been learning and discussing in class.

First, the article discusses the usage of Iraqi police in combination with US soldiers. What rules are supposed to be followed if the US soldiers are expected to continue fighting the insurgents but at the same time are expected to interact with the Iraq police. I would assume that the domestic police force have different 'rule of engagement' per se than soldiers. Is this an issue, or what 'evolution' have the ROW experienced to deal with such a situation, are they even applicable?

Second, at the end of the article, it notes that civilian clothed soldiers were sent into a neighborhood:

"Fighting broke out after US troops in civilian clothes entered a central district of Hilla, they said. US military sources said the clash started after troops went to arrest rogue elements in the Mehdi Army."

Does this not go against one of the primary 'norms/rules' that were designed to protect our soldiers abroad? This little sentence indicates to me a policy decision that indicates a disregard for the well being of the US soldier or a lack of understanding of the purpose and design of the ROW designed to protect POWs.

What specific policy changes to US military doctrine would decrease the levels of atrocity by US forces in conflict situations and in detention?

After watching the film Ghosts of Abu Ghraib, it appears that there is a lack of responsibility within the leadership of the civilian lead military establishment that left the individual solider confused.

The first thing I found worrisome was the issue of the rules of engagement. In the documentary, there was an interview with one of the military police/soldiers, who said that when he landed in Iraq, he asked for the rule of engagement (ROE). He was told if it looks like the enemy - shoot it. However, that goes against the function of a the rules of engagement card which sets the parameters of action for the solider, which is based on self defense. [For an example of ROE click here.] The ROE also lets the soldier, who is disconnected from policy-making, know what his/her government expects of him/her, as the government is the employer.

However, what is apparent in the film is that there was no 'leadership' that guided the actions of soldiers once he/she became confused. In the documentary, it appeared the the US combatants at Abu Ghraib were fearful and disoriented. They were given the perspective of us versus them, and that they were directly involved with preventing another 9/11. This policy-maker implemented fear and confusion lead to really horrible things.

What comes through is that Bush, Rumsfield, General Miller, and the other 'politicians' are poor leaders. Edgar Puryear argues that a good military leader in the American military is apolitical, selfless (meaning takes responsibility when things go wrong, gives credit when things go well), is professional, loves his soldiers and looks to their well being, and refuses to be or surround himself/herself with 'Yes Men.' The President is the Commander in Chief of our military. However, the breakdown in the chain of command leading to Abu Ghraib results from bad leadership. The Bush possy all acted as Yes Men as did American Generals such as Miller. It is telling that those that did not agree with the Bush possy were sidelined, which is further evidence of extremely bad leadership. They also put newbies in charge of an overcrowded prison, made soldiers/military police into prison guards, for which they had NO training, and it appears that from the video, were never given such training. With a population of several thousand inmates and only a few soldiers guarding/running the facility, it is apparent that fear and an inability to deal with the situation would arise. However, this is not the soldiers' fault. It is the government's fault as it left its soldiers unable to deal with a situation as per IHL, even if they had wanted to.

In the documentary, a clip is shown of Rumsfield stating that he forgot the chain of command paper work so could not answer a question. This incident indicates a dissociation with the military establishment that the SECDEF is supposed to be coordinating. As Clausewitz indicates, the military is an instrument of the civilian government. As the Bush possy were bad leaders, the effects of bad leadership led to confusion and wide interpretation of the 'rules' that permeated down though the ranks. I believe that if the ground soldiers had been given the proper procedural guidance, Abu Ghraib would not have happened (or at least to the extent it did). The government sanctioned the inhumane treatment and torture of these prisoners through a lack of leadership.

A few reflection on how the US government could have prevented the atrocities of Abu Ghraib:

1. Ensure that all soldiers have the rules of engagement - the 'if it looks like the enemy shoot' is not acceptable.
2. Provide more 'guards.' The government ought to realize that soldiers are trained for specific tasks. If the soldiers are given a specific task that hey are not trained to do, it is important to supplement their new task with guidance and training.
3. Do no put a General already criticized of human rights and IHL violations in a position to inflict more damage, as this is a sanctioning by the government of continued violations.
4. The US Congress needs to take greater control and FORCE the Bush possy to take responsibility for its bad and inept leadership. This would enhance the institutionalization within the military the importance of IHL and the government's desire to follow them.
   
5. It must be remembered that the military is an instrument of the civilian government, it is the government who makes the policy that the military follows.
   

IHL huge success?

According to a 2007 BBC Article, the establishment of the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocols have been a huge success in establishing and sustaining a distinction between civilians and combatants during conflict. However, I would have to argue that I do not agree. I think that it is overly optimistic of Imogen Foulkes, the author, to claim that IHL has established a norm in which civilians are not targeted by fighters. Especially as recent estimates of Iraqi civilian causalities are extremely high in comparison to US troop causalities. If the US was making a sustained effort to distinguish between Iraqi fighters and innocent civilians, then the estimates should not be as high. Also, the US is experiencing increasing pressure at home to resolve the current problem, which means that it may use increasingly harsh means to achieve its 'victory.' (Downes, 2006; and Valentino et al, 2006). If the norm of identifying yourself as a combatant was as strong as this article believes, the fighters in Iraqi would distinguish themselves from the civilian population, however, they do not. I also think that the violation of IHL is increasing as a result of US open deviance from the IHL regime as per my previous post. Also, in terms of internal conflicts, state's claim that their sovereignty is dominant and international norms and regulations are secondary to national security needs.

I do not understand how different standards can apply to internal and international conflict. Also, how is the IHL regime going to adapt to the changing nature of war and conflict? As non-state actors increasingly play a role, but do no adhere to the regime, what will happen to the regime?

Combining Two: Brazen Disregard and the Martens Clause

On page 135, Byers writes,

Previous administrations at least paid lip-service to the existence of normative constraints by concealing and denying their covert operations. The Bush Administration… lets the mask slip, to the discredit of the nation and… at the peril of the soldiers whom so many of the rules are designed to protect.

Open violation by the world’s unipolar power (Layne, 2006) of the customary norms, rules of war and IHL that structure the international system precipitates a general downward trend in respecting the individual and potential increase of anarchy in battle. It is realized that a different Administration may bring back the importance of the Geneva Conventions, but undoing the damage may take some time.

Historically, a hegemon supports a regime as it sees the big picture strategy, which is in its best interest, and is willing to take the ‘negatives’ to maintain that regime (Kindleberger 1951, and Krasner, 1976). It is commonly believed that protecting human rights at the domestic and international level is important and in accordance with American values. This is demonstrated by the aid distributed by the US government to countries to facilitate thgovernment reforms to enhance democracy. The American nation was founded on the principles of civil liberties and restricting state invasive interference in the lives of people. However, Bush indicates that national security is more important than respecting the foundations of the nation he is currently leading. Despite historical evidence, which indicates Americans are more focused on domestic than foreign affairs, and want to safe guard their rights over national security issues (Jordan et al, 1999), Bush seems to disregard the norms of the US. Even if Bush and his Administration openly disregard the Geneva Conventions and IHL, he should at least abide by the Martens Clause which states if the rules of war can not be agreed upon, the state should follow its own national laws as per below:

in cases not included in the Regulations adopted by them, the inhabitants and the belligerents remain under the protection and the rule of the principles of the law of nations, as they result from the usages established among civilized peoples, from the laws of humanity, and the dictates of the public. [emphasis added by me] [Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907].

The US government of the time ratified the treaty. In cases of disagree, this Clause permits a return to national laws and security, which is interesting as the US Constitution in the Judicial section, note not Executive, it states:

Article 3 - The Judicial Branch: Section 3 - Treason
Treason against the United States, shall consist only in levying War against them, or in adhering to their Enemies, giving them Aid and Comfort. No Person shall be convicted of Treason unless on the Testimony of two Witnesses to the same overt Act, or on Confession in open Court. The Congress shall have power to declare the Punishment of Treason, but no Attainder of Treason shall work Corruption of Blood, or Forfeiture except during the Life of the Person attainted.

This indicates that if a person commits acts of treason (attacking or going to war on the US government) then the Judicial Branch of the government has the right and authority to deal with that person. I do not understand how Bush thinks he has the authority to bypass the founding fathers of this nation, which as a result damages the prospects that American soldiers or civilians caught in a conflict will be treated with the norms of IHL.

As a result of this open disregard of IHL and the basic principles of the US norms, Bush is indicating the soldiers are no longer valuable once they are captured or detained by ‘enemy combatants.’ I highly doubt the American people would agree that their individual rights and the protection of their armed forces are secondary issues in the realm of global norms. If Bush and his Administration were truly concerned about ‘national security’ in this GWOT, then he would allot greater funding to the surveillance of ports and other infrastructure of the state. However, Bush is currently fear-mongering by seeking an ‘easy’ and unethical way through his declared GWOT. In his belief of American preponderant position in the political, economic, and military spheres of the globe he forgets that for every action there is a reaction. Terrorists and other actors may increasingly have justification for ignoring or leaving the IHL regime because the US has openly left.

Apparently I have a very negative view of the prospects of IHL if the hegemon of the system openly violates and indicates it does not support the regime, indicating that the regime will begin to crack and crumble.

Johnson's Noncombatants

In Johnson's Mortality and Contemporary Warfare, Chapter 4, he discusses the issue of the possible justifications and (im)morality in attacking noncombatants.

However, upon reading the section about the nondiscriminatory attacks on Tutsi and Hutu refugees, what appears to be severely lacking is a focus on the Hutu fighters usig Hutu refugees as shields. On page 140, the first full paragraph, Johnson alludes to the Hutu fighters using human shields as protection, but focuses more on the immoral nature of the Tutsis killing the Hutu refugees after it was realized that the Hutu fighters were using human shields. However, this mentioning is minimal and not specific. There is greater discussion about the wrongs done by the Tutsi fighters. However, to me the Hutu fighters have the greater blame, if such a word can be utilized, as they introduced the noncombatants into the conflict. Upon not being able to distinguish between combatants and noncombatants, the Tutsi fighters became non-discriminant in their targeting.

Please correct me if I am wrong.